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1 Introduction
Online platforms that directly or indirectly reveal some characteristics of a good (e.g. through
users’ comments), which the merchant cannot directly disclose in a credible way, are now
present in a wide range of markets. Such platforms are also known as ‘information aggregat-
ors’, given their ability to collect and make information available to consumers.
Information is crucial for all sorts of decisions and, ceteris paribus, it is always preferable
to have access to high quality information.Information asymmetries can, however, trigger
reactions on the part of all (strategic) agents involved, potentially producing unexpected
consequences. Indubitably, the internet, through dedicated information platforms, is a major
source of information for most buyers.
Information aggregators can be arbitrarily sorted into three categories: i) information
repositories, such as travel guides, ii) non-anonymous booking/selling platforms, such as
Booking, and iii) anonymous booking platforms, such as Airbnb. The first category includes
platforms that only provide information about third-party products. They do not provide
purchasing or booking services. Meanwhile, the two remaining types of platforms allow to
directly purchase or reserve a product. They crucial differ however, in that non-anonymous
platforms reveal the parties’ identities before the transaction is concluded. Hence, agents can
finalise the transaction outside the platform. Anonymous platforms instead do not disclose
the identity of the seller until the transaction has been completed through the platform.
One of the main challenge for non-anonymous platforms is to avoid ‘showrooming’, where
potential customers use the platform to collect information but purchase elsewhere. This
can occur, for example, when the platform is in direct competition with the producer, who
has a clear incentive to undercut the platform to avoid commissions. Agreements under
‘most favoured nation’ (MFN) clauses restrict the action space of producers, who commit
to not undercutting the platform.1 Many authorities consider MFN clauses to be an anti-
competitive and welfare decreasing practice. Together with non-anonymous platforms, they
have been extensively studied in the literature (see Section 1.1 for a brief review).
This paper focuses instead on anonymous platforms, and is, to the best of my knowledge,
the first attempt to specifically study this kind of platform. Airbnb is possibly the most well-
known platform of this type, but it is certainly not the only one. Others, such as Homeaway,
Hotwire, and Housify, also ensure that buyers cannot match the information online with offline
sellers. Holidays Auto was also anonymous until recently. Note that anonymous platforms
may indirectly affect the information available offline if buyers can update their expectations
about product availability.2
In my model, each firm produces one horizontally differentiated product. In the benchmark
model, transactions only occur offline. Once the (unique) platform operates in a market,
firms can sell on- and offline simultaneously. Unitary-demand buyers can choose to buy on-
or offline; they can also decide not to buy.
The purpose of the model is to capture the important trade-off that anonymity inevitably
produces. The platform provides information to increase the quality of matches between
the two market sides. Yet, it cannot disclose all the relevant information, given that it
1Under ‘narrow’ MFN, providers are free to undercut on competing platforms, but cannot do so directly.
Under ‘broad’ MFN, they cannot undercut on competing platforms either.
2Information may thus matter for both parties. I assume here that the only buyers seek information.
However, platforms do also allow firms to gather information about consumers’ tastes and, hence, on potential
demand for new products (Jullien and Pavan, 2019) or other buyer characteristics (Fradkin, 2019).
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must guarantee anonymity.3 Hence, the information observable online must be distinct from
that observable offline. To reproduce this trade-off in the model, I assume that buyers care
about two unrelated attributes of the good, which I denote as location and value. Location
is only observable offline while value is only observable online. Location may refer to the
physical position of the seller, or any other attribute of the seller that is easily observed
offline. A typical example would consist of the seller’s chain (i.e. loyalty schemes). Similarly,
value is any attribute that cannot be directly observed before consumption (e.g. experience
goods) but that can be inferred when using the platform, directly or through comments from
previous customers. Value must be something that cannot be credibly revealed by the seller.
Importantly, the value attribute determines the willingness of an agent to pay for a good
(hence the name). However, consumers have heterogeneous preferences over the attribute,
such that value remains an element of horizontal differentiation across consumers.
I based my model on the ‘spokes’ model of non-localised horizontal competition, which is
an extension of Hotelling. Its general properties are discussed in the seminal paper by Chen
and Riordan (2007) and in Reggiani (2020), and it has been used in a wide and heterogeneous
set of environments (see Caminal and Claici, 2007; Caminal and Granero, 2012; Germano
and Meier, 2013; Reggiani, 2014; Mantovani and Ruiz-Aliseda, 2016).4 I depart from the
original setting in several respects: two selling channels are active (online and offline) and,
crucially, consumers’ information set, which depends on the selling channel, is never perfect.
The spokes model is a particularly appropriate choice for the context under analysis. For
one, it accommodates market expansions even when firms are already actively competing.
Furthermore, non-localised competition is essential to meaningfully represent firms that are
simultaneously competing on- and offline.5
Another important property of the spokes model is that buyers may be on an ‘empty’ or
an ‘occupied’ spoke.6 Agents on empty spokes are equidistant from all active firms, while
those on occupied spokes are asymmetrically located with respect to firms; that is, they are
closer to one than to the others.
Offline purchases minimise transport costs, a feature that is related to location. Online
purchases instead minimise mismatch cost, a feature related to value. Agents’ location determ-
ines whether a consumer prefers to buy on- or offline. In the equilibrium with the platform,
agents belong to one of three groups: inactive, surfers (i.e. online buyers) and walkers (i.e.
offline buyers). In equilibrium, the willingness to pay and the demand elasticity of an agent
depend on the market (on- or offline) and on whether an agent is on an empty or occupied
spoke. Firms anticipate the different elasticities and consequently charge different prices on-
and offline.
My model shows that the price offline is always weakly higher with the platform than
without. However, the platform also indirectly increases the quality of matches for offline
buyers, making it possible to have regions (in terms of good valuation) for which the presence
of the platform is Pareto preferred by all walkers. The online price is lower than the price
without the platform if and only if the good valuation is very low. In terms of welfare, the
platform increases the expected value of transactions. Hence, it is again possible that an
3If agents could match information on- and offline, this would allow them to circumvent anonymity, collect
information online (known as showrooming) and ultimately buy offline.
4Somaini and Einav (2013) and Edelman and Wright (2015) propose models that are isomorphic to the
spokes model in order to study competition when customers suffer partial lock-in.
5Neither of these features is present under Hotelling or Salop.
6I further explain the meanings of ‘empty’ and ‘occupied’ in Section 2.
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agent is better off even when paying a larger price.
In terms of the supply side, the generated profit is larger with the platform. In my model,
the platform is free of use (one could assume that their revenue comes from advertisement)
and all the profit goes to firms. If the assumption were made that the platform charges firms,
the results would still hold as long as fees are non-distorting (lump-sum), and the increase
in profit is shared between the platform and firms based on their bargaining power. Overall,
the equilibrium with the platform is Pareto superior when the good has either a very low or
very high valuation. For intermediate values, welfare depends on the combination of several
parameters.
Section 1.1 briefly discusses how this study relates to the existing literature. Section 2 then
introduces and solves the model. Section 3 compares the equilibrium with and without the
platform and studies the consequences of anonymous platforms on both sides of the market.
Section 4 concludes. The proofs are provided in Appendix A.
1.1 Related Literature
This study builds on a large body of work on platforms, which covers a variety of aspects
from multiple perspectives. Spulber (2019) provides an overview with interesting insights on
the broad links between the economics of platforms and the standard partial and general
equilibrium literature. He also discusses the link between platforms and innovation. The
most recent contributions extensively study competition across platforms7 and multihoming
(Armstrong, 2006; Anderson et al., 2019; Bryan and Gans, 2019; Casadesus-Masanell and
Campbell, 2019; Halaburda and Yehezkel, 2019; Karle et al., 2020), as well as showrooming
and the most-favoured-nation clause (Edelman and Wright, 2015; Foros et al., 2017; Johnson,
2017; Calzada et al., 2019; Johansen and Vergé, 2020; Ronayne and Taylor, 2020; Wang and
Wright, 2020). While most of the platform literature is static, Cabral (2019); Kanoria and
Saban (2020) are notable exceptions. My work departs from this literature by considering
anonymous platforms.
Mueller-Frank and Pai (2014) suggest that platforms sell visibility, and study the con-
sequent welfare implications. They consider that consumers’ attention is displaced, hence
more information on one product reduces information on the competing products. I instead
assume that the platform equally reveals the characteristics of all the listed products.
Information about goods plays a crucial role in this work. Within the broad theoretical
literature interested in consumers’ information, it is possible to distinguish three focuses:
homogeneous goods, vertical differentiation and horizontal differentiation. When goods are
homogeneous, consumers cannot observe prices and seek the cheapest seller (See Baye and
Morgan, 2001; Janssen et al., 2011; Dinerstein et al., 2018; Marshall, 2020, and the literature
therein).8 Ronayne (2020); Ronayne and Taylor (2020) study the case where online platforms
are used to search for the cheapest price. I similarly assume that firms operate both directly
and through the platform and, like these authors, find that when the platform is active, prices
(weakly) increase both for platform users and non-users. Beyond the fact that I consider
7Arya et al. (2007) assess a seller that operates directly and through a retailer. Strictly speaking, a retailer
is not a platform, but their model would also fit well with a platform. They focus on the competition induced
by the fact that the seller is competing again themselves, by using two channels simultaneously.
8This literature also extends to the case of ‘search with heterogeneous goods’. See, for example, Anderson
and Renault (1999); Armstrong et al. (2009); Moraga-González and Petrikaitė (2013); Bar-Isaac et al. (2012)
and the related literature.
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horizontally differentiated goods, a crucial difference in my model is, once again, that the
platform is anonymous.
When goods are vertically differentiated, information may play a simple screening role or,
as in Miklós-Thal and Schumacher (2013), produce incentives for sellers by reducing moral
hazard. The theoretical models in Klein et al. (2016); Vial and Zurita (2017) suggest that, in
the presence of platforms, the vertical component may be secondary. Quality on a platform
converges in equilibrium because ‘lemons’ either disappear or are forced to reach higher quality
standards. In the same spirit, Cabral and Hortaçsu (2010) use Ebay data to show that - in
the long run - poorly ranked firms either disappear or converge to their competitors’ quality;
Hossain et al. (2011) obtain the same result in an experimental setting.
In my work, goods are solely horizontally differentiated. This is similarly the case in
Galeotti and Moraga-González (2009), who focus on non-anonymous platforms. Meanwhile,
Romanyuk and Smolin (2019) look specifically at the seller-buyer match: the platform decides
how much information to reveal in order to maximise their own profit. In both Anderson and
Renault (2009) and Janssen and Teteryatnikova (2016), each firm unilaterally chooses how
much information to disclose about their (horizontally differentiated) product and that of
their competitor. They find that information improves match quality but also pushes prices
upward. Jullien and Pavan (2019) observe similar results in a two-sided market setting. My
findings are comparable, but for different reasons and through a distinct mechanism. Among
other things, in my model, agents endogenously choose if they want to acquire the information
(despite the consequent increase in price) and firms can disclose information only about their
own product.
Showing a similar interest in the role of information, Armstrong and Zhou (2020) adopt a
complementary perspective to that used here. In my study, the type of information gathered
online is fixed, and the focus is on the incentives to gather information in the first place.
Consumers may or may not acquire information (surfers and walkers, respectively), affecting
their willingness to pay and, consequently, the equilibrium. Armstrong and Zhou (2020)
instead look specifically at the information that may be transmitted. All buyers receive a
signal9 and the authors endeavour to discern how different information signals affect the
equilibrium. Put differently, they conduct an analysis of a firm or a platform’s optimal choice
relative to the information to be disclosed.
The empirical literature on online reviews generally disregards possible differences between
price search, vertical and horizontal differentiation. Some analyses focus on the effectiveness
of reviews in shaping consumers’ behaviour (DellaVigna and Pollet, 2009; Pope, 2009; Ghose
et al., 2012), while others examine the phenomenon of manipulated reviews (Dellarocas, 2006;
Martinelli, 2006; Dai et al., 2012; Mayzlin et al., 2013; Luca and Zervas, 2016). Chevalier
and Mayzlin (2006); Anderson and Magruder (2012); Luca (2016) explore the link between
reviews and profits.
The focus here is on anonymous platforms, a characteristic which, to the best of my
knowledge, has not been specifically used in previous analyses. While Celik (2009) utilises
anonymous platforms to motivate his work, and employs a similar setting in that goods are
horizontally differentiated and the platform does not disclose all the attributes of the good,
he focuses on the profit maximising amount of information to disclose, in line with Romanyuk
and Smolin (2019).
Airbnb is perhaps the most well-known anonymous platform, and my study thus contrib-
9Translated into my model, this would imply that everyone is forced to buy online.
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utes to the (mostly empirical) literature on this online marketplace. Farronato and Fradkin
(2019), for example, study competition between regular hotels and Airbnb, showing that
the latter increases welfare when hotels are at full capacity. In the model here, I restrict
my attention to the case in which all sellers are on the same platform (which would corres-
pond to the case of competition across listings on Airbnb). A possible spin-off of my work
might therefore study competition between two platforms, one anonymous and the other non-
anonymous. While in the analysis that follows only buyers are interested in the quality of the
match, on Airbnb hosts and guests are both looking for a high-quality match. To this regard,
Fradkin (2019) studies how Airbnb attempts to solve this problem, maximising the quality of
matches on both sides. Finally, I simply assume that the platform is able to convey valuable
information. Fradkin et al. (2019) study how reviews may be sincere or strategic on Airbnb,
depending on technical details determining when reviews are made public.
2 The Model
In what follows, I construct my model based on the spokes model (Chen and Riordan, 2007).
I begin by presenting some of its general characteristics, introducing the terminology and
discussing several technical aspects that are common to any spokes-based model. Section 2.1
then formally describes the model, while Sections 2.2 and 2.3 solve it respectively for the
benchmark case (without the platform) and the equilibrium with the platform.
As its name suggests, the spokes model takes the shape of a star, uniting several Hotelling
lines (spokes) of equal length. The two extremes of a spoke are the origin and the termination.
Spokes connect through their terminal, forming a radial shape as portrayed in Figure 1.
In this spokes model, a good has two attributes and both are elements of horizontal
differentiation. The first attribute has a one to one correspondence with the position in
the network, and is thus referred to as the location.10 The second attribute determines the
willingness to pay for the good, and is thus referred to as the value.
The position of a firm defines the first attribute of the good, i.e. its location. Firms, by
assumption, can only be located at the spoke origins and cannot overlap.11 This means that
the set of origins corresponds to the set of potential varieties (in terms of the first attribute)
that could be produced. The cardinality of the set (number of potential varieties) is then
equal to the number of spokes (N).
By definition, a spoke is empty if no firm is located at its origin and, therefore, the
corresponding potential variety is not produced. A spoke is occupied if a firm is located at its
origin; the potential variety thus materialises as a brand.12
Consumers have unitary demand and are uniformly distributed over all the spokes.13
Consumers’ position in the network represents their preference in terms of the (horizontal)
location attribute. Consumers experience a ‘nuisance’, often referred to as transport cost,
that is linearly increasing in the distance between their and the product’s position. This
10The spatial dimension can refer to the physical location of a shop or, more abstractly, as any observable
attribute of the good (for example, Mark and Reggiani, 2020 studies the case of automobile repair shops: in
that case, ‘location’ represents the car manufacturer to whom the repair shop is associated).
11This makes firms indifferent to their location: all spokes are identical. Reggiani (2014) extends the model
to allow firms to endogenously locate at any point.
12In other words, brands are the potential varieties that are produced in equilibrium.
13Note that, by construction, consumers are uniformly distributed over all spokes, including empty ones.
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transport cost is interpreted as the disutility from consuming a good whose location attribute
is different from that desired.
Beyond location, each potential variety is characterised by the second relevant attribute:
the value. Preferences over the latter are independent across agents and space, hence this is
a second element of horizontal heterogeneity. For example, in the lodging industry, the value
attribute could depend on certain elements (possibly relevant only for some customers) such
as flexible check-in and check-out, the policy towards pets, presence of sport installations or
bathtubs, etc. In the case of a restaurant, this could be related, for example, to background
music (if any), with each consumer having a potentially different ranking in terms of genre.14
The spokes model does have a technical limitation, due to the presence of empty spokes.
Suppose that each consumer were indifferent, in terms of value, across all potential varieties.
Then, agents on empty spokes would form a mass willing to switch brand at any marginal
price change. The consequent discontinuity in demand would inhibit the existence of a pure
strategy equilibrium. Chen and Riordan (2007) discuss this issue in detail as well as possible
strategies to adopt. This problem disappears as soon as each consumer ranks potential vari-
eties according to at least one strict inequality. In line with Chen and Riordan (2007), the
value of every potential variety is binary. For the sake of simplicity, for each consumer only
one potential variety represents a good match in terms of the value attribute, while all the
others are a poor match.15
A crucial difference between Chen and Riordan (2007) and this model is related to the
information available to consumers. In the original spokes model, agents have full information:
before purchase they can observe both location and value for all brands. The purpose of this
paper is to assess the case of (experience) goods for which one attribute (in this case, value)
is not directly observable, but that the platform is able to reveal.
As discussed in Section 1, platforms are non-anonymous if they openly reveal the identity
of merchants and anonymous if they hide the latter until the transaction is completed. I
restrict my attention to the latter. Anonymity has two major consequences: i) ‘showrooming’
(searching online but buying offline) is sensibly discouraged16 and ii) in order to prevent
showrooming, the platform must ensure that one cannot match information on- and offline.
Hence, the brand ’s attribute location must be hidden, which in turn introduces uncertainty
on the transport cost.
Consumers have two purchasing options. Surfers use the platform to buy online. Walkers
instead buy offline, but they may have searched on the platform beforehand. Both walkers
and surfers have the outside option of not buying.
Firms can sell offline (traditional sales), online (electronic sales) or both. If use of the
platform is sufficiently costly (for consumers or firms), an equilibrium where at least some
agents operate offline is immediately obtained. To keep the mechanism as clean as possible,
I assume that the platform is free for both firms and consumers. Under this assumption, the
dominant strategy for all firms is to be active online, with walkers verifying ex-ante that one
of the brands for sale is a good match for them.17 Not intuitively, adding a usage cost for
14In both examples, the spatial dimension could be either the physical location of the property or other
characteristics, such as the menu for restaurants.
15Chen and Riordan (2007) assume two high quality matches and introduce additional restrictions on which
varieties can represent a good match.
16Searching online still provides valuable information to offline buyers, by revealing the set of brands currently
being produced.
17Free usage implies that I cannot replicate an equilibrium with some firms selling only offline.
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consumers would tip the balance in favour of consuming online, given that it would increase
the uncertainty in the offline market. A usage cost for firms would, instead, favour the offline
market, because some brands would not be available online.18 I show that in equilibrium,
walking is optimal for some agents even under free usage. While I assume that firms cannot
sell online outside the platform, this has no major consequences under free usage.
In a traditional market, agents are uninformed and firms are all offline. When a platform
enters the market, all agents connect to the platform and all firms sell online under the
assumption that it’s free. The first effect of the platform is trivial: some customers discover
that none of the brands are valuable to them and restrain from buying. This represents a
welfare improvement. Amongst all other customers, some will walk (buy offline), others will
surf (buy online) and finally some will decide not to buy. Fig. 1 summarises the set of possible


















Figure 1: Set of possible behaviours of an agent
2.1 Formal structure
There exist N ≥ 4 spokes of length 12 . The origin of each spoke corresponds to a variety (in
terms of the location attribute that could be produced, hence, the set of potential varieties
has cardinality N . I assume that n ∈ [2, N − 1] firms are active. By construction, each
firm locates at the origin of a different spoke, hence there are n occupied and N − n empty
spokes.19 Therefore, the set of brands (subset of potential varieties that is produced) has
cardinality n.
The unitary mass of agents is uniformly distributed across the entire network. The location
of an agent on spoke i is defined by xi, i.e. their distance from the origin of the same spoke.
By construction, the distance between the agent and the origin of any other spoke i′ 6= i is
1− xi.
18With usage costs, results are qualitatively similar, though it becomes harder to disentangle the different
forces. Quantitatively, the number of walkers and of agents that do not directly buy depend on the assumptions
on usage costs.
19Assuming n > 2 guarantees that the market is not a monopoly, while n < N − 1 is meant to ensure that
at least one spoke is empty.
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Each potential variety has two relevant attributes, which horizontally differentiate it from
the others. The attributes, referred to as location and value, are orthogonal to each other.
Each agent’s preference over location depends on their position in the network. The distance
between an agent and a brand determines the transport cost. An agent also has a preference
over the attribute value. Specifically, every agent is randomly matched to exactly one of the
potential varieties.20 The quality of the match is binary: for an agent whose high-quality
match is of variety k, the value v̂ is
v̂ =
{
v, if j = k
0, otherwise.
(1)
Each potential variety has the same ex-ante probability 1/N of being a good match (i.e.
v̂ = v).21 Under full information, the willingness of an agent xi to pay to consume brand
j depends on the transport cost (distance between xi and j) and the quality of the match
(whether or not j is a high-quality match for xi).
As the location of a brand is observable, consumers can anticipate their transport cost.
The value attribute has an ‘experience’ component. That is, the buyer cannot directly observe
it before consumption, but an online platform can reveal it. Differently from the previous
literature, I focus on anonymous platforms. Hiding the identity of a merchant implies hiding
its location. A novel trade-off appears: either one buys offline and observes location but not
value, or one buys online and observes value but not location.
Section 2.2 solves the benchmark model without the platform. There, buyers can only
choose between not buying and buying under a veil of ignorance, gambling over the expected
value of a purchase. Section 2.3 computes the equilibrium with an active anonymous platform.
In what follows, subscript o refers to occupied spokes, while e refers to empty ones.
Superscript t refers to the traditional setting (without the platform). When the platform is
instead active, superscript s refers to surfers and online sales, while superscript w refers to
walkers and offline sales.
2.2 Traditional selling (benchmark without the platform)
Without the platform, buyers cannot observe the value. Each potential variety has an expec-
ted value E(v̂) = 1N v. All that matters for the decision to buy is the observable transport
cost, which is xi if consuming a brand produced at the origin of the spoke where the buyer
is located, or 1 − xi otherwise. The optimal strategy for an agent on an occupied spoke is
therefore to buy the brand on their own spoke. For agents on an empty spoke, all brands are
expected to be equally good and thus they will randomly pick one (if they consume).




i − xi, where pti is the price paid. Hence, the expected utility is positive for any agent
located at xi ≤ vN − p
t
i ≡ x̂to. The expected utility of an agent, conditional on being on an




i − (1 − xi). Hence, the expected utility is positive for any
agent located at xi ≥ 1− vN + p
t
i ≡ x̂te.
20The assumption can be relaxed, as long as the number of matches is strictly less than the number of
spokes, but doing so doesn’t produce any additional insight.
21Despite some differences in the interpretation, up to this point the structure is equivalent to Chen and
Riordan (2007), with one exception. Specifically, these authors assume that agents enjoy a good match with
two potential varieties, where the additional match always occurs with the potential variety on the spoke where
the agent is located.
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The first segment refers to the case where the firm serves only agents on its spoke, while the
second segment materialises when some agents on empty spokes are also buying. In the latter





















Figure 2: Inverse demand without platform
Fig. 2 illustrates the inverse demand function. At Dtj =
1
N , the slope changes from −
N
2 to
− nN2(N−n) . This point corresponds to the moment when firms start serving spokes other than
their own. If there are as many empty spokes as occupied ones (n = N2 ), then each firm will
serve (on average) one additional spoke and the slope remains the same. If instead there are
less occupied than empty spokes (n < N2 ), then each firm will serve (on average) more than
one additional spoke and the slope flattens (the opposite occurs if n > N2 ).






j), the equilibrium price
without the platform is defined by Eq. (3) when n ≥ N2 and by Eq. (4) when n <
N



















































∂N < 0, while
∂pt
∂n ≥ 0. The interpretation of both signs is the same. When
the number of spokes N increases (given the number of brands), so does the number of empty
spokes, which means that the demand is more elastic. The same occurs if the number of














b) n > N
2
Figure 3: Inverse demand without platform
2.3 Equilibrium with the platform
Since the platform is free for everyone, selling through both channels (on- and offline) is
optimal for all firms.
Any agent planning to purchase will scout online to make sure that one of the brands for
sale is a good match for them (i.e. the one for which v̂ = v). With probability (N−n)/N , this
is not the case and the agent does not buy. Such cases are referred to as inactive. Henceforth,
inactive agents are always implicitly excluded from statements, unless the contrary is specified.
With complementary probability, nN , agents observe online that one brand generates v̂ = v
for them. They must then decide if they prefer to surf (buy online), to walk (buy offline) or
to not buy. As we will see, their decision depends on a combination of the equilibrium prices
and agents’ locations over the network. The platform being anonymous, surfers observe the
value (v̂) but they cannot compute the transport cost, while the opposite is true for walkers.
The expected utility of a surfer located at xi will be:
E(U si ) =
{








− psj if spoke i is occupied.
(5)




n − (1− xi)− p
w
j if spoke i is empty
v
n − xi − p
w
j if spoke i is occupied.
(6)
Using Eqs. (5) and (6), I compute the location of agents that are indifferent between two
options. On empty spokes:







the locations where buying online is strictly preferred to not buying.
• x̂we = 1− vn +p
w







offline is strictly preferred.
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On occupied spokes:
• x̂so = nn−2
(
n−1









being the locations where buying online is strictly preferred to not buying.
• x̂wo = vn − p
w
j is indifferent between walking and not buying. For xi ∈ (0, x̂wo ) buying
offline is strictly preferred.





j − pwj ) + 1− v
)
, agents are indifferent between surfing and walking. If






they prefer to surf.
I restrict my attention to when at least some agents surf. The corresponding necessary
and sufficient condition is thus that v > 12 . Lemma 2 and Fig. 4 depict all potential scenarios
in which some surfers are active.
Lemma 2. In equilibrium, one of three scenarios can materialise.
On occupied spokes, walkers (if any) always concentrate near the origin: xi ∈ (0, x̂wo ) and
xi ∈ (0, x̃o) respectively under scenarios A) and B). Nobody walks in scenario C). Surfers













A) and B). Under scenario C), everyone surfs. On occupied spokes, the market remains
uncovered only in scenario A), where nobody buys for xi ∈ (x̂wo , x̂so).






buy online, the remaining agents
do not buy.



























Figure 4: Potential scenarios: occupied spokes on the left side, empty spokes on the right side
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where Dwj and D
s
j represent the demand off- and online, respectively. Firms choose both prices
simultaneously and I focus on symmetric equilibria.
Demands are piece-wise defined, depending on the value of v and, hence, on the scenario.22






; in Region B,
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Given the symmetry of the model, I focus on symmetric Bertrand-Nash equilibria in pure
strategy. All firms in equilibrium set the same prices pw and ps, serve the same amount of
walkers and surfers and earn the same profit.
Proposition 1. The piece-wise-defined symmetric equilibrium prices pw and ps are reported


















































































where α = nN − 2N + 2n.
Corollary. In Region C, walkers are not active. Occupied spokes are fully covered and all
agents are surfers (x̃o = 0). Empty spokes are partially covered, with the upper limit of Region
C representing the case in which the entire market is covered, including on empty spokes.
Proof. See appendix A.
Figs. 5 and 6 depict consumption and prices in equilibrium. The following proposition
compares pw and ps.



























Figure 6: Equilibrium prices with platform
Proposition 2. As long as n ∈ (3, 4) and N > 4n4−n do not simultaneously hold, then a unique
value v̂(n,N) exists, such that ps > pw if and only if v > v̂(n,N) (Fig. 7, left panel).
If n ∈ (3, 4) and N > 4n4−n simultaneously hold, then values ṽa, ṽb and ṽc exist, such that
ps > pw if v ∈ (ṽa, ṽb) or v > ṽc, while ps < pw if v < ṽa or v ∈ (ṽb, ṽc) (Fig. 7, right panel).
Corollary. In regions A and C, the slope of pw is 12n , hence p
w is flatter than ps, whose slope
is 12 . Both price functions are steeper in Region B than in their two neighbouring regions.
When N n(n
2+n−4)
2(n−2) , then p
w is steeper than ps.
Proof. See appendix A.
One can immediately observe from Proposition 2 and Fig. 7 that the online price is always
above the offline price for sufficiently large v, while the opposite is always true for sufficiently
small v. These results imply that for valuable goods, the added value of the platform comes
from the reduction in the risk of a poor match, for which buyers are willing to pay. Conversely,
for low-value goods, the platform undercuts the price of the offline market.
In most cases (left panel in Fig. 7), prices cross only once. However, when n is very small
( 2 < n < 3) and N sufficiently large (N > 4n4−n), prices will cross once in each region. These
parameters correspond to a situation with very few brands, compared to the set of potential
varieties. Such a scenario is likely to occur if the market exhibits high entry costs. Then,












In the left panel, conditions n ∈ (3, 4) and N > 4n
4−n hold simultaneously. The right panel covers all other cases, with the caveat that
crossing of pw and ps could occur in any region of the graph, depending on the relative size of n and N .
Figure 7: Comparison pw and ps
lower or higher than the offline one. While it remains true that the online price is higher for
topmost-valued goods, this is now also the case for lower-middle valued goods. Furthermore,
while it is still the case that the online price is lower for bottom-valued goods, this also now
true for the upper-middle valued goods.
3 Analysis of previous results and welfare
Any regulation or policy recommendation related to the presence of anonymous platforms
should be based on a welfare analysis. In this section, I first look at the domain of v for which
results hold, then I compare prices with and without the platform. Finally, I look at profits
and consumers’ utility.
Regarding the domain, it is immediately obvious that the platform is only active for v ≥ 12 .
It is simple to show that, indeed, no one would ever surf for smaller values of the good; the
platform would have no purpose. Furthermore, the upper bound of the domain is set by
v ≤ 3N−2n2(N−n) .
23 It is immediate to prove that 3N−2n2(N−n) < N , hence, the domain without the
platform is wider both above and below.
Proposition 3 relates prices with and without the platform.
Proposition 3. The walkers price (pw) is always weakly larger than the price without the
platform (pt), with pw = pt in Region A and pw > pt in Region B and C.
The surfers price (ps) is smaller than the price without the platform for v below some
threshold, and larger above it. The unique crossing occurs in Region A if and only if n > 3.
When n ≤ 3, crossing will occur either in Regions B or C.
Proof. See the appendix (where the above-mentioned thresholds are properly defined).
The increase in price follows the logic of da Graça and Masson (2013): when buyers are
better informed, they attach a higher value to the good and sellers will try to extract more
surplus from them. Ronayne (2020) and Ronayne and Taylor (2020) obtain similar results
for the case of platforms selling homogeneous goods through non-anonymous platforms. It is
important to bear in mind that the rise in price reflects an increase in valuation, hence the
welfare consequences are not immediately obvious.
23Technically, the upper bound with the platform is arbitrarily set for when the market is fully covered and
the model could allow for larger v, which would simply translate into an increase in prices.
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This analysis of profits requires one further consideration. Long-run profits would inev-
itably tend to zero in this simple model, absent barriers to entry. For the sake of simplicity,
I proceed with the most standard setting, where firms pay an entry cost to operate. Entry
naturally stops as soon as an additional firm is unable to fully recover the entry cost. I assume
that entry costs are the same with and without the platform. Henceforth, gross profits and
net profits refer respectively to when entry costs are excluded or included.
Moreover, it should be clarified that the entry condition that allows to endogenously set
entry is non-linear and cannot be defined explicitly in a tractable way. Nevertheless, the
long-run equilibrium condition that gross profits π must equate entry costs F , together with
Lemma 3 are enough to obtain Proposition 4.
Lemma 3. Comparing net profits in two scenarios, say x and y, if πx > πy, then nx > ny.
Proposition 4. Gross profit is larger with the platform than without it.
Corollary. The number of active firms with the platform must be at least as large as without
it.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Proposition 4 provides a first important result. The supply side is better off with the
platform. In this model, the platform has two effects. On the one hand, it improves the
quality of matches and hence the willingness of some consumers to pay. On the other hand, it
allows firms to price discriminate between informed and uninformed consumers, which would
not be possible with non-anonymous platforms. This implies that more value is generated
through the better matching system, and that such value is, at least partially, appropriated
by the supply side.
Technically speaking, the model suggests that the increase in profit directly translates
into a benefit for firms. This is a consequence of the assumption that the platform operates
for free. The current setting, with only one active platform facing firms with some market
power, is not equipped to analyse the bargaining process between firms and the platform:
one could easily justify a bargaining outcome that leads to any possible split of the surplus
across players. Hence, the most honest (albeit loose) interpretation of Proposition 4 is that
the platform generates a surplus that will be split across n firms and the platform, depending
on the relative bargaining power.
With regard to the demand side, several simultaneous effects are potentially at work:
change in the number of available varieties n, change in price and change in the probability
of a good match. An increase in n could lead to a weak increase in consumers’ welfare by
increasing the amount of high quality matches that can be made. An increase in prices would
decrease consumers’ welfare. Finally, a greater probability of a high quality match would
increase welfare.
Lemma 4. The equilibrium with the platform is weakly Pareto superior for all agents that
are inactive without the platform (i.e. xi >
v
2N on occupied spokes and all agents on empty
spokes).
Proof. See Appendix A.
One can consequently focus on agents that are active without the platform.
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Proposition 5. Within the boundaries of Region A, the scenario with a platform Pareto
dominates that without it.
In Regions B and C, there are always some agents that are strictly better off with the platform.
Depending on the specific parameter values, the platform setting may or may not Pareto
dominate the opposing one.
In Region C, it is possible to identify a threshold for v above which the platform scenario
Pareto dominates that without it. Furthermore, n > 4.4 is a sufficient (yet not necessary)
condition for the entire Region C to lie above the previously mentioned threshold on v.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Together, Propositions 4 and 5 provide a very clear picture of the welfare consequences
of the entry of anonymised platforms in a market. First of all, in a quite mechanical way,
the platform provides better information to consumers, hence we observe a higher quality of
matches, with some agents who stop consuming because they are able to anticipate that the
product of their choice is not produced.
Less immediate results include, looking at the supply side, an increase in the total surplus
that firms can extract from consumers. This occurs through three combined channels: i)
more transactions are carried out, ii) the value of the transactions is larger and iii) sellers are
able to distinguish between two groups of consumers with different degrees of willingness to
pay and, because of anonymity, can set different prices to extract the surplus.
In terms of consumers’ welfare, the platform scenario always Pareto dominates that
without it for any v either sufficiently small (Region A) or sufficiently large (part of or pos-
sibly all of Region C). For intermediate values of v, the welfare effect on consumers is mixed.
On the one hand, consumers’ expected value from consumption increases, but on the other
hand, price also increases. The speed at which value and price rise depend on the model’s
parameters. Thus, while there can be cases in which everyone is better off with the platform,
it is equally plausible that some agents benefit from the platform while others lose from it.
4 Final remarks
The previous literature has tended to focus on platforms that reveal the seller’s identity before
the transaction is concluded. This inevitably allows for showrooming, where potential buyers
can easily match information online and offline and then buy where it is cheaper. To prevent
this from happening, many platforms use most ‘favoured nation clauses’ (also known as ‘price
parity’) to diminish the incentive to showroom. However, this practice has often been seen
as anti-competitive by the competent authorities. Meanwhile, academic research has shown
that it may lead to significant welfare losses.
Other platforms, Airbnb possibly being the most successful, have adopted a different
model. Their platform is anonymous, and thus prevents any possible contact outside the
platform. This makes showrooming virtually impossible and means that firms can set different
prices on- and offline.
To the best of my knowledge, this article is the first attempt to specifically study the
consequences of an anonymous platform entering a previously offline market. I show that the
offline price is weakly increasing with the platform while the online price is smaller than that
without platform for low-valued goods and larger otherwise.
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While the platform always brings in new consumers, some consumers stop buying. These
are all agents who would have had a low-quality match in a traditional market, inducing a
negative ex-post utility. I show that profits are always larger when the platform is active.
In terms of consumers’ welfare, the platform setting Pareto dominates that without it
when buyers’ valuation is either sufficiently low or sufficiently high. However, for intermediate
valuations, the specific combination of parameter values matters: under most configurations
the platform Pareto dominates, yet under other configurations some agents are better off with
the platform at the expenses of the remaining agents.
Note that the possible loss in surplus for some consumers is due only to the increase in
price. In other words, it derives from a transfer and not from a proper loss, which means that
overall welfare always increases. If side-compensations were feasible, then it would be possible
to conclude that anonymous platforms are always Pareto superior to the setting without a
platform.
The model suggests that anonymous platforms should, in most cases, be incentivised,
particularly where it is possible to compensate buyers in the unlikely event of agents who lose
from the presence of the platform.
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Appendix A Proofs
Proof of Lemma 2. The lemma restricts its attention to cases in which at least some agents
are buying online.
The proof is organised by showing that:
1. having some people buying offline on empty spokes is sufficient to imply that nobody
will buy online (neither on empty nor on occupied spokes),
2. having non-served empty spokes (i.e. nobody located on empty spokes is buying) implies
that nobody will buy online on occupied spokes either,
3. the two results together imply the lemma.
1. On an empty spoke, an agent prefers to walk than to surf if and only if v < nn−1(p
s−pw).
On an occupied spoke, agents prefer to walk than to surf if xi < x̃o, while they prefer to
surf than to walk if xi > x̃o. If x̃o >
1
2 , all agents on an occupied spoke prefer to walk. This
occurs if v < nn−1(p
s − pw).
Hence, if the condition is met to have some walkers on empty spokes, it follows both that
i) at any location on empty spokes, agents prefer to walk than to surf, and ii) at any location
on occupied spokes, agents prefer to walk than to surf.
If the condition is not met, then some agents may surf on occupied spokes and at all
locations on empty spokes agents will certainly either surf or not buy.
Hence, we can already exclude any equilibrium in which some agents walk on empty spokes
and, simultaneously, some agents surf on occupied spokes.
This suffices to conclude that, restricting on equilibria where at least some agents surf,
there cannot be an equilibrium in which agents on empty spokes buy offline.
2. Suppose that nobody is willing to buy online on empty spokes. This requires that the
expected utility of being a surfer is negative at all locations on empty spokes, which occurs if
and only if v < pw + 12 .
We are interested in equilibria where at least some agents buy online. If empty spokes are
not served, then there must be some agents buying online on occupied spokes. The condition
for the surfers’ expected utility to be positive on occupied spokes is v > pw + 12 , which is
incompatible with the previous condition.
3. Point 1 of this proof shows that having some agents that buy offline on empty spokes
implies that there cannot be surfers on occupied spokes.
Point 2 shows that if nobody buys on empty spokes then there cannot be surfers on
occupied spokes.
In both cases, it means that nobody would buy online. Hence, putting the two results
together, it follows that the only possible way to have some surfers on occupied spokes is to
also have surfers on empty spokes.
Proof of Proposition 1. Using the definitions of x̂wo , x̂
s
o, x̂o and x̂
s
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I compute the candidate equilibrium price for Regions A and C first, leaving Region B at
the end. Each firm j maximises simultaneously online and offline profits. In each region, the






π = pwj D
w + psjD
s. (13)
With a little abuse of notation, let’s denote πk(p
w, ps), pwk and p
s
k, with k = {a, b, c},
respectively the profit function, and the equilibrium prices off- and on-line in Region k.







The lower bound is arbitrarily assumed to be v ≥ 12 , to ensure that some agents buy online.
Using in Eq. (13) the demand off- and on-line for Region A as defined in Eqs. (11) and (12),































































As an upper bound we consider when x̂se ≥ 0, which implies that empty spokes are fully
covered.






















(psj − pwj )
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+ 2(N − n)
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From Eq. (17) we immediately obtain n(n−1)(p
s
j − 2pwj ) = n−1(n) (1 − v), which implies that
x̃o = 0. This means that, under this equilibrium, only surfers are active.



























2N(n− 1)− n(n− 2)




















The existence conditions of the region are defined below.
















(n+ 2)(n− 1)(nN − 2N + 2n)
n3 + (n− 2)(nN − 2N + 2n)
)
− (3n− 4)(nN − 2N + 2n)








n3 + (n− 2)α
)
− (n− 2)α+ 4n
2(n− 1)
4(n3 + (n− 2)α)
(23)






. This is a very
unstable condition: the demand here has a kink. Any marginal reduction in one of the






and we would jump to Region C







and we would jump to Region A and its equilibrium.
In order for prices in Eqs. (22) and (23) to be an equilibrium, a slight decrease of either















This translates into conditions:
1− v + 2 n
n− 1
(psb − pwb ) > 0 (24)
nv − 2 n
2
n− 1
(psb − pwb ) + 2(N − n)
(





Both restrictions lead to condition v < 2N(n−1)−n(n−2)(n+2)(N−n) , which represents the upper bound for
Region B. It is immediate to notice that this is also the lower bound for Region C.
Moving to the other end of Region B: in order for prices in Eqs. (22) and (23) to be
an equilibrium, a slight increase of either price should not increase profits to prevent jumps
































+ (N − n)(v − 1
2
− 2psb) < 0 (27)
Both restrictions lead to condition v < n(3n−4)2(n+2)(n−1) , which represents the lower bound for
Region B. It is immediate to notice that this is also the upper bound for Region A.
Proof of Proposition 2. Since pw and ps are both linear and defined over the same inter-
vals, it is a matter of simple algebra to compare slopes, intercepts and crossings.
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For Region A: psa− pwa =
2(n−1)v−n
4n . This is weakly positive if and only if v ≥
n
2(n−1) ≡ va.








a cross within Region A if and
only if n > 3.
For Region C, psc ≥ pwc if and only if v ≥ 1 ≡ vc. Notice that the upper bound for Region
C is always larger than 1. The lower bound is larger than 1 if either n > 4 or n < 4 and
N > 4n(4−n) .
For Region B, psb is steeper than p
w
b if and only if N <
n(n2+n−4)
2(n−2) . If N =
n(n2+n−4)
2(n−2) ,
then the two functions have the same slope: in that case, when n = 3 (hence, N = 12),







b if v =
n(N(n−2)−2n(n−1))
N(n−2)−2n(n2+n−4) ≡ vb.
Putting all the above information together, it is possible to conclude that the following
scenarios may occur:
• if n ∈ (2, 3] and N > 4n4−n , then p
s crosses pw only once, from below, in Region C, at
v̂(n,N) = vc.
• if n ∈ (2, 3] and N < 4n4−n , then p
s crosses pw only once, from below, in Region B, at
v̂(n,N) = vb. In the degenerate case of n = 3 and N =
4n




b for all values
in Region B.
• if n ∈ (3, 4) and N < 4n4−n or n > 4, then p
s crosses pw only once, from below, in Region
A, at v̂(n,N) = va.
• if n ∈ (3, 4) and N > 4n4−n , then p
s crosses pw three times. From below, in Region A,
at v̂(n,N) = va; from above in Region B, at v̂(n,N) = vb; from below, in Region C, at
v̂(n,N) = vc.
Proof of Proposition 3. First notice that:







• without the platform, the equilibrium price is pt = v2n if
– either N ≥ 2n and v < N






• the upper bound with the platform v = 3N−2n2(N−n) is






2 when N < 2n.
Therefore, the relevant price without the platform is always pt = v2n . This is actually the
same price as pwa , that is the price for walkers in Region A.
Hence, we immediately conclude, based on previous results, that:
• in Region A, pw = pt, in region B and C pw > pt.
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• if n ≥ 3, then ps ≥ pt if and only if v ≥ va, with ps = pt when v = va.
When n < 3, one should compare psb and p
s
c with p




















and N < 2n(5n−2)
10n−3n2−4 .
The crossing psb = p








and N ≥ 2n(5n−2)
10n−3n2−4 .
Proof of Lemma 3 and Proposition 4. This proof begins by showing that Lemma 3 holds.
For this, it is important to keep in mind the following aspects. Obviously, when a single agent
maximises an objective function, it must be the case that the function is increasing at the left
of the maximum and decreasing at its right. However, in the case of entry, the new entrant
is not choosing n to maximise profits. Similarly to the textbook case of the problem of the
commons, a new entrant is only considering whether profit, conditional on their entry, will
be enough to recover any fixed cost.
As a consequence, suppose that πx > πy and that, for a given ny, condition πy = F holds.
Then, it must be that πx > F , which implies that new firms will enter and that nx > ny.
In order to prove Proposition 4, profit is analysed region by region, always comparing the
case with the platform (denoted πk, with k = {a, b, c}) and without it (denoted by πt).
Region A The difference in profits πa − πt is:
4v2(N − n)(n− 2) +Nn(N(n− 2) + 2n)(4v2 − 4v + 1)
8N3(n− 2)n
(28)
which is always positive for v ≥ 12 .
Region B The difference in profits πb − πt is:
4v2
(




α− 2n2 − 3n+ 4)
)
+ αN(α− 8n(n− 1))
8N3 (α(n− 2) + n3)
(29)
It is a matter of algebra to show that, as long as v ≥ n(3n−4)
2(n2+n−2) (which is the lower bound
to be in Region B), Eq. (29) is increasing in v and is positive at v = n(3n−4)
2(n2+n−2) .
Region C The difference in profits πc − πt is:
4v2(N − n)(N2 − nN − 1)− 4vN(N − 2n)(N − n) +N(N − 2n)2
8N3(N − n)
(30)
from which it follows that profit in Region C is larger as long as the numerator is positive,
that is
v >
N(N − 2n)(N − n) + (N − 2n)
√
N(N − n)
2(N − n)(N2 − nN − 1)
(31)
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Since the condition on v is weaker than the condition defining the lower bound of Region C,
it follows that it is always verified.
Assuming that firms face some fixed cost (this could be, for example, a licence or settlement
cost), potential competitors will enter if, at any point in time, profit exceeds those costs (this
is true, irrespective of whether profit is increasing or decreasing in n). Hence, if gross profit
is larger with the platform, potential entrants will keep joining.
Proof of Lemma 4 and Proposition 5. First, I show that the equilibrium with a plat-
form is weakly Pareto superior for all agents that are inactive without the platform (Lemma 4).
I then proceed with the proof of Proposition 5.
If an agent is inactive without the platform, they can choose to be inactive with the
platform too, in which case they would achieve the same level of utility. Hence, the scenario
with a platform must be weakly preferred. If any previously inactive agent starts consuming
under the platform equilibrium, then by revealed preferences they must be better off (strictly,
for all agents but the marginal consumer).
The proof of Proposition 5 is organised by region. In region A, the walker price is the
same as without the platform: pt = pw. Hence, at first sight everyone could replicate the
equilibrium without the platform and get at least the same utility.
It is important to look at this in more detail. First of all, notice that the platform allows
every potential consumer to figure out which are the n varieties for sale. Conversely, without
the platform some agents decided to buy while ignoring whether the variety that they are
looking for is even produced. This has two consequences: some agents that were buying
without the platform will realise that their preferred variety is not produced. Their expected
utility was positive, but ex-post they were necessarily suffering a loss, as the quality of the
match was deemed unsatisfactory. These agents will stop consuming, moving from an ex-post
negative utility to a zero utility, hence their welfare increases.
The second consequence concerns walkers. They will keep buying offline and they pay the
same price. However, their ex-ante expected utility increases because their probability of a
high quality match increases from 1N to
1
n .
Finally, if an agent was buying without the platform and becomes a surfer with the
platform, then again by revealed preferences they must be better off. The argument is simple.
Those agents would have been able to walk (i.e. to buy offline) at the same price as before
and with a larger probability of a good match. If they decide to surf (i.e. to buy online), it
must be that this option is even more profitable for them.
In Region B, pt < pw, walkers hence pay more than before, but their probability of a
good match is larger. Thus, the overall effect is ambiguous. Comparing the utility of agents
without and with the platform doesn’t lead to a definitive result. It is possible, however, to
compute the utility of the marginal agent without the platform (i.e. x̂to =
v
2N ), as well as
to show that max{EU s, EUw} ≥ EU t, that is, under all possible combinations of parameter
values, the expected utility of the marginal agent is always larger with the platform. The
marginal agent is therefore always strictly better off with the platform, and hence there also
exists a neighbourhood around x̂to where this is true.
At the other extreme, when xi = 0, there is no simple expression to define when the
platform scenario is preferred. There are specific combinations of parameters for which the
platform scenario is preferred, while other combinations imply that only a subset of agents is
better off with the platform.
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In Region C, one can look directly at the case of xi = 0, which is the location where the
condition for the platform scenario to be preferred is most stringent. In this region, everyone
buys online at a greater price than that without the platform. Yet, the better quality of
matches may justify the extra cost.
Computing the difference in utility between buyers without the platform and surfers, it
appears that the scenario with a platform is (weakly) Pareto superior whenever
v ≥ N(N(3n− 4)− 2(n− 2)n)
2(N − n)(Nn+ n− 2)
. (32)
Comparing this threshold with the lower bound for Region C, it is possible to conclude that
the platform scenario is Pareto superior if and only if the (non-trivial) quadratic inequality




> 0 is satisfied. Having n > 4.4
is a sufficient condition for the inequality to be satisfied, in which case the platform scenario
Pareto dominates the scenario without a platform, in Region C. When 2 < n < 4.4, there
are several combinations of n,N and v such that the platform scenario Pareto dominates.
However, there are several other combinations of parameters for which the benefits of the
platform are unevenly distributed, with some agents that benefit and others that lose from
the presence of the platform.
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